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Politics of Deposit Insurance Reform: the
Case of Argentina
Geoffrey P. Millert

This paper explores the decision by the Argentine government to abolish deposit insurance. Prior to 1991, the Argentine
banking system operated under a regime of optional, explicit
deposit insurance, coupled with extensive implicit deposit insurance in the form of central bank assistance to failing banks. In
1991 and 1992, Argentina reversed this policy by repealing the
country's deposit insurance program and attempting to convince
financial markets that it would not under any circumstances
rescue a failing bank.
These events bear on U.S. deposit insurance reform because
they allow the investigation of a real-world case in which a significant economic system repealed its program of deposit insurance. It is often said in the United States that cutbacks in the
deposit insurance guarantee are politically impossible. Yet such
reforms have been implemented in Argentina, so far with apparent success. This paper considers the bearing of the Argentine
experience on proposals for U.S. deposit insurance reform.
I. INTRODUCTION

It is often said that countries that do not expressly guarantee deposits do so implicitly. When a bank fails, the government
faces tremendous pressure to insure deposits from individual
' Kirkland & Ellis Professor, University of Chicago Law School. I would like to
thank the many Argentines who generously consented to be interviewed or otherwise
assisted in this project, including Julio Alsogaray, Ricardo Angl6s, Dr. Miguel A.
Balestrini, Javier A. Bolzico, Juan J. Bruchou, Omar C. Crillo, Maria Elena Deligiannis,
Cesar A. Deymonnaz, Dr. Roberto Domenech, Dr. Roberto Dominguez, Eduardo J.
Fasulino, Roque Fernandez, Javier Gonzdlez Fraga, Jos6 Maria Ibarbia, Enrique J.
LoncAn, Roque Maccarone, Dr. Jos6 Luis Machinea, Dr. Augusto C. Magliano, Facundo
G6mez Minujifn, Raul Passano, Norberto Carlos Peruzzotti, Ignacio J. Carlos Premoli,
Gonzalo Sdnchez Sorondo, Osvaldo J. Ventura, and Alfredo M. Vitolo. I would like to
thank Tomds J.T. Balifio, Jose Barra, Roberto Gagarella, Dr. Augusto C. Magliano, Mark
Ramseyer, and Liliana Schumacher for comments, and Ricardo Maldonado for valuable
research help.
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depositors who may have lost their life savings. The potential
political costs to a government of not insuring deposits are so
overwhelming that the responsible officials often have no
choice-or so it is said-but to protect depositors even if doing so
is seen as undesirable from the standpoint of social policy ex
ante.1
In at least one country, Argentina, this accepted wisdom
about deposit insurance is now being put to the test.2 Until 1991,
Argentina both provided an explicit deposit insurance guarantee
to participating institutions and, more importantly, offered implicit deposit insurance in the form of extensive open-bank assistance to troubled institutions. The current administration of
President Carlos Menem, however, has repealed all forms of
deposit insurance, explicit or implicit.3
This paper-which draws on extensive interviews conducted
in December 1992 with present and former Argentine government officials, politicians, economists, and attorneys-analyzes
the government's decision to abolish all forms of deposit insurance for banks. I address the following questions.
First, has Argentina actually repealed deposit insurance?
The Menem government's claim that it will not back deposits in
failed banks has not yet been put to the test, as there have been
no major bank failures in Argentina since the repeal of deposit
insurance. If a big bank did fail, the question is whether the
government would be able to withstand the political pressures to
bail out the bank's depositors-particularly in a political culture
such as that of Argentina, where the government has traditionally assumed the responsibility (albeit one incompetently fulfilled)
for protecting the welfare of its citizens. Even if the government
were able to withstand a single bank failure, would it adhere to a
strict no-bailout policy if the failure of one bank led to systemic
panic? In other words, what has the government done to
precommit in a reliable fashion to not bailing out depositors in a
failed bank even in the face of overwhelming political pressure to
do so?4
See, for example, Edward J. Kane and George G. Kaufman, Incentive Conflict in
Deposit Insurance Regulation: Evidence from Australia, 1 Pac Basin Fin J 13, 13-14
(1993).
2 Other countries in Latin America-Chile and Uruguay-are also in the process of
repealing deposit insurance or otherwise cutting back on the safety net for bank customers. Personal interview with Dr. Augusto C. Magliano, Secretario Ejecutivo, Federacion
Iberoamericana de Asociaciones Finacieras, Dec 14, 1992 ("Magliano Interview").
Carta OrgAnica del Banco Central de la Repfiblica Argentina, Ley 24, 144 (1992).
On precommitment, see Jon Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality
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It turns out that the Menem government has provided a
surprisingly high level of assurance to domestic and international
financial markets that it will not rescue a failing bank or its
depositors. Legislation passed in 1992 bars the central bank from
offering any form of deposit insurance, either implicit or explicit,
and prohibits assistance to troubled banks except short term
loans on good security.' The central bank must also hold gold or
foreign currency reserves at least equal to the domestic monetary
base,6 a requirement that might be violated if the central bank
were to bail out depositors in a major bank failure. Interviews
conducted for this article revealed remarkable consensus among
knowledgeable persons that the government will not rescue a
failing bank.
This is not to say that the government's commitment to the
repeal of all forms of deposit insurance would hold in the event of
a nationwide banking panic, or that a new government (elections
are scheduled for 1995) would adhere to the no-bailout policy. It
appears, however, that the Menem government has accomplished
as much as could reasonably be expected in convincing the relevant actors that there really is no deposit insurance in Argentina
today.
A second question raised by Argentina's recent reforms concerns the underlying politics. In the United States, despite the
disastrous failures of the deposit insurance funds for the savings
and loan and banking industries over the past ten years, deposit
insurance repeal appears to be politically unthinkable.7 What
was different about Argentina?
Although the repeal of deposit insurance in Argentina was
part of a complex process extending over at least a decade, the
principal factors appear relatively straightforward. First, Argentina was in the midst of a catastrophic economic crisis at the time
deposit insurance was repealed. Hyperinflation and economic
deterioration had driven the country-one of the richest nations
in the world in 1930 8-- into the status of a third world nation.'

and Irrationality(Cambridge, rev ed 1984).
Carta Orgdnica del Banco Central (cited in note 3).
6 See Economic and Social Progress in Latin America: 1991 Report 27 (Intl Amer
Development Bank, 1991).
See notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
A See Alan M. Taylor, External Dependence, Demographic Burdens, and Argentine
Economic Decline after the Belle -Opoque,52 J Econ Hist 907, 908 (1992).
' Gross national product per capita (GNP) in Argentina in 1990 was US$2,134, as
compared with Canada's gross domestic product per capita (GDP) of US$19,500. Mark S.
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As a result, the public reached a remarkable consensus that
radical reforms were needed to shrink the bloated state-owned
industrial base and deregulate the economy. There was surprisingly little political opposition to the basic elements of Menem's
program of radical privatization and deregulation; indeed, the
opposition Radical Party has sometimes claimed that Menem is
simply implementing programs that it conceived.1"
Although one affected interest group-foreign banks-had no
real objection to the repeal of deposit insurance, 1 other major
interest groups-domestic Argentine banks and financial institutions-did oppose repeal. However, all were willing to accept
substantial limitations on the scope of the program. In addition,
all banks recognized that Menem's overall agenda of market
liberalization was in their interest, and their support for the
broader program muted their opposition to deposit insurance
reform. Further, and quite importantly, the economic collapse
had driven most private deposits out of the banking system.
Thus, the domestic banks which were principally affected by the
repeal were not able to call on a substantial base of private depositors to support them in resisting deposit insurance repeal. In
the end, the government's mandate to implement radical reforms
overwhelmed the banking industry's lukewarm resistance to
deposit insurance repeal.
A third question is how Argentine banks responded to the
recent reforms. Have private arrangements replaced the government safety net? If so, how effective have these responses been?
It appears that repeal of deposit insurance has had some
effects: private banks now offer varying interest rates on deposits; Argentine banks are seeking lines of credit from foreign
banks and are organizing for mutual support in the event of a
financial crisis; and private rating organizations are being established. As yet, there have been no significant runs on uninsured
banks, nor have there been any major bank failures since deposit
insurance was abolished. It is still too early to determine whether private market mechanisms will provide effective substitutes

Hoffman, ed, 1993 World Almanac and Book of Facts 729, 739 (Pharos Books, 1992). This
was roughly equal to the GDPs of Chile (US$2,130) and Malaysia (US$2,460), and significantly less than the GDP of Czechoslovakia (US$7,700) and the GNPs of Hungary
(US$5,800) and Poland (US$4,200). Id at 742, 776, 747, 761, 790.
1 See Bill Hinchberger, Argentina's Master of Reform, 26 Inst Investor 79, 84 (May
1992).
" Foreign banks in Argentina are widely viewed as extremely safe because the
parent institutions will not fail and will not let their Argentine subsidiaries fail.
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for deposit insurance.
This article is organized as follows. Part I addresses the
general economic background, and Part II considers the reforms
themselves. Part Ill analyzes the forces that allowed the changes
to occur, addresses the question whether implicit deposit insurance remains in Argentina, and considers the strategies which
the private sector has adopted to respond to the elimination of
the government safety net. The article ends with a brief conclusion.
II. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
The economic system in Argentina prior to the reforms of the
Menem Administration, elected in 1989, can aptly be described as
a corporatist state. Juan Per6n, who came to power in 1946,
committed the country to an economic system under which government ownership of or substantial intervention in industry was
nearly a defining attribute. By 1990, the government owned
many industries, including telecommunications systems, utilities,
petroleum firms, iron and steel works, and much more. 2 Along
with government ownership of or control over industrial production came a system in which the bureaucracy often functioned
more as a mediator between powerful interest groups than an
independent formulator of policy.'" Powerful industrial unions
and other industrial groups acted as de facto parts of the government, enjoying a "virtually monopolistic status as the quasi-official national representative for a particular functional activity."14

The inefficiencies of the Argentine corporatist state were
reflected in its economic output. Real gross domestic product
(GDP) growth rates were anemic or negative through much of the
1980s, as shown in Table 1. These inefficiencies, together with
the highly developed Argentine capacity to evade taxes, resulted
in pervasive budget deficits, as shown in Table 2. The government funded much of its deficits by issuing currency, predictably
resulting in inflation rates that ranged from the disastrous (by
U.S. standards) to the catastrophic, as shown in Table 3.
12 See, for example, William C. Smith, Hyperinflation,Macroeconomic Instability, and

Neoliberal Restructuring in Democratic Argentina, in Edward C. Epstein, ed, The New
Argentine Democracy: The Search for a Successful Formula 20, 48 (Praeger, 1992).
13 See Edward C. Epstein, Democracy in Argentina, in Epstein, ed, The New Argentine Democracy 3, 13-14 (cited in note 12).
14 See id at 14.
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Moreover, as shown in Table 4, Argentina's external debt more
than doubled during the 1980s, from US$27 billion in 1980 to
US$63 billion in 1989. The overall picture during the 1980s, in
short, suggested an economy on the brink of disaster.
Table 1:

GROWTH (DECLINE) IN

REAL GDP, 1980-89

Year

Percent Change

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

1.5%
-6.6%
-4.9%
3.0%
2.6%
-4.3%
5.6%
2.2%
-2.7%
-4.6%

Source: Inter-American Development Bank, Economic and
Social Progressin Latin America: 1990 Report (1990).

Table 2:
Year
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

BUDGET DEFICITS AS PERCENT OF

GDP, 1980-89
Deficit
-7.1%
-12.1%
-15.0%
-14.5%
-11.6%
-5.7%
-4.9%
-6.6%
-9.0%
-8.3%

Source: Inter-American Development Bank, Economic and
Social Progress in Latin America: 1990 Report (1990).
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Table 3: CONSUMER PRICES, 1980-89
Year

Average Annual Increase
100.8%
104.5%
164.8%
343.8%
626.7%
672.2%
90.1%
131.3%
343.0%
3,079.2%

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

Source: Inter-American Development Bank, Economic and
Social Progress in Latin America: 1990 Report (1990).
Table 4: ARGENTINA'S ExTEPNAL DEBT, 1980-89
Year

Disbursed Debt (Millions $US)

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

27,157
35,657
43,634
45,919
48,857
50,947
52,374
58,423
58,936
63,314

Source: Inter-American Development Bank, Economic and
Social Progressin Latin America: 1990 Report (1990).

The disaster struck in 1988 and 1989. In April 1988, the
government defaulted on its foreign bank debt. 5 In July, inflation accelerated: consumer prices rose 26.6 percent, and continued to skyrocket the following year, reaching 150.4 percent in

"

See Smith, Hyperinflation at 36 (cited in note 12).
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June 1989.16 President Radil Alfonsin attempted to maintain a
strong domestic currency against the dollar, 7 but in late January and early February 1989, the central bank ran out of foreign
currency and abandoned its support for the austral. The economy
degenerated into one of the worst hyperinflations in history.18
At the end of May 1989, two weeks after Menem won the
presidential elections, Argentines looted supermarkets and rioted
in cities across the country.19 Banks closed. Consumer prices
increased 114.5 percent in June 1989 and 196.6 percent in July
1989.20 The nation was descending into chaos.
Menem took power in July 1989, five months before his
scheduled inauguration, in the midst of virtually complete chaos
and collapse.2 ' Hyperinflation struck again in October 1989,
forcing a bank holiday in late December 1989 and early January
1990.22 During the bank holiday, the government substituted
government bonds for deposits; as a result, when the banks reopened there was little for depositors to withdraw.'
Meanwhile, Menem surprised almost everyone by announcing a program of privatization and economic liberalization as farreaching as anywhere in the world. Privatization was extraordinarily sweeping, with sales or leases of the telephone company
(notorious as one of the worst in the world), the national airline, television networks, the electric company, the national railway, and even 10,000 kilometers of state-owned highway.'
Inflation continued at fever pace in 1990, with consumer
prices rising 2,314 percent.26 In early April 1991, however, economic minister Domingo Cavallo implemented the so-called

16 See id at 38.
17 See id at 39.
18 See id at 40.
19 See id; Recent PoliticalDevelopments, Country Credit Risk Service (Jul 31, 1989),

available on LEXIS (WORLD library, ECOSVC file); Latin American Newsletters, Argentina Breaks with the Past, Latin Am Weekly Rep 5 (Dec 21, 1989).
20 See Smith, Hyperinflation at 40 (cited in note 12).
21 Latin American Newsletters, Argentina Breaks with the Past, Latin Am Weekly
Rep 5 (Dec 21, 1989).
See notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
See id.
24 See William Ratliff and Roger Fontaine, Changing Course: The CapitalistRevolution in Argentina 38 (Hoover Inst, 1990).
2
See Argentina: Commitment to Privatization,Inst Inv, Special Sponsored Section
on Argentina 7 (Oct, 1991), available on NEXIS (INVEST file).
26 See Economic and Social Progress in Latin America: 1991 Report 29 (Inter-American Development Bank, 1991).
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convertibility program.2 This program required that domestic
money be backed by government holdings of gold or foreign reserves. Also, under the program, the central bank agreed to convert domestic currency into dollars (and vice versa) at a fixed
exchange rate.'
The convertibility program appears to have accomplished an
astonishing turnaround in Argentina's economic fortunes. Inflation fell precipitously and has remained low; the inflation rate for
1992 was a mere 17.5 percent. 29 The economy has boomed, with
GDP growing 9 percent in 1992.0 Argentines repatriated a substantial portion of the $50 billion which they had been holding
offshore as protection against the domestic chaos.3 ' The nation's
risk premium-measured by the spread between the yields on
dollar-denominated Argentine bonds and LIBOR (a benchmark
interest rate for international financial transactions)-fell from
31.9 percent in the first quarter of 1990 to 8.4 percent in the
fourth quarter of 1992.32 The inflation rate for 1993 will almost
certainly be lower still.33 The developments since 1991 appear
little short of an economic miracle. However, whether they are
miracle or mirage remains to be seen.
III. DEPOSIT INSURANCE REFORMS
Argentina has totally repealed all forms of deposit insurance
for private banks, and has barred the central bank from providing open-bank assistance to troubled institutions. These changes
are a radical break from the past and are part of a broader program devised by the Menem Administration to revitalize the
Argentine economy.

' See World Bank, Argentina: Public Finance Review from Insolvency to Growth,
Report No 10827-AR 181 (Feb 11, 1993).
' To say that the reform "dollarized" the economy, however, is somewhat misleading
since, as a result of the financial crisis of 1989-91, the domestic currency had lost almost
all credibility and the economy had effectively been dollarized by the private sector in any
event.
' Nathanial C. Nash, A New Rush into Latin America, NY Times C1, C6 (Apr 11,
1993). See Banco de la Nacion Argentina, Economic Indicators,7 Fundaci6n MediterrAnea
Newsletter 3, 3 (Sept 1992).
o Nash, NY Times at C6 (cited in note 29).
31 See Paul Hannon, Argentina:A New Spirit of Confidence, Euroweek (Sept 5, 1992),
available on LEXIS (WORLD library, ALLWLD file).
' Banco de la Nacion Argentina, Outlook, 8 Fundaci6n Mediterrdnea Newsletter 1, 2
(Mar 1993).
' See Banco de la Nacion Argentina, Economic Indicators,8 Fundaci6n Mediterrdnea
Newsletter 3, 3 (Sept 1993).
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Traditionally, Argentina has had both implicit and explicit
deposit insurance. Per6n nationalized deposits in private Argentine banks in 1946, thus effectively backing them with the
government's own credit (and directing the deposited funds to
uses favored by the government).3 4 The government privatized
deposits in 1957, but continued to provide a full guarantee for
local currency deposits. 5 Deposits were again nationalized in
1973, 3 and again returned to the private banking sector
in
37
full.
in
guaranteed
deposits
currency
domestic
1977, with
In 1979, the military government made deposit insurance for
private banks optional and required that insured banks pay a
premium of 3/10,000 of average liabilities subject to reserve requirements." The central bank provided full coverage for the
first 1 million pesos (about US$640) and 90 percent coverage
thereafter.39
These changes gave way to the exigencies of the banking
crisis of 1980-1982. The failure in 1980 of a large private bank
resulted in losses to uninsured depositors.4" Depositors began to
withdraw funds from private banks and to place them in banks
deemed to present little risk of failure-primarily foreign banks
and banks backed by government entities.4 ' Shakier private
banks also found themselves unable to obtain funds on the interbank call market-the market in which banks borrow from and
lend to one another." A bank panic ensued.43
To cope with the growing crisis, the central bank retroactively increased by a factor of 100 the ceiling on deposits covered in
full under the deposit insurance law-raising full coverage to

3' Augusto C. Magliano, 1 La Proteccion al Depositante 85-86 (Federacion
Iberoamericana De Asociaciones Financieras, 1988).
Id at 86.
Tomds J.T. Baliflo, The Argentine Banking Crisis of 1980, in V. Sundararajan and
Tomds J.T. Balifio, eds, Banking Crises: Cases and Issues 58, 84 (Intl Monetary Fund,
1991); Magliano, 1 La Proteccion al Depositante at 86 (cited in note 34).
" Ley de Entidades Financieras Nro 21.526 (1977), cited in Magliano, 1 La Proteccion
al Depositante at 87 (cited in note 34).
38 Balifio, The Argentine Banking Crisis of 1980 at 87 (cited in note 36).
' Id at 87 & 87 n 50.
40 Id at 91; Magliano, 2 La Proteccion al Depositante 191 (Federacion Iberoamericana
de Asociaciones Financieras, 1988).
4 Balifio, The Argentine Banking Crisis of 1980 at 91 (cited in note 36).
42 Id.

" Personal interview with Dr. Josd Luis Machinea, economic consultant, Dec 15,
1992 ("Machinea Interview").

129]

Politicsof DepositInsuranceReform

approximately US$60,000. 44 It also created a facility to provide
open-bank assistance to banks whose deposits were being
drained, and quickly provided assistance to three of the worst-hit
institutions.4 5 In addition, reforms instituted in 1980 and 1982
greatly increased the central bank's powers to facilitate mergers.46 One consequence of the new policies was an enormous increase in central bank lending to financial institutions: the ratio
of such central bank loans to reserve money rose from 1.87 percent in February 1980 to 110.11 percent in December 1982. 47
As a result of the troubles in 1980-1982, seventy-one financial institutions were liquidated."s The central bank incurred
high costs in administering the insolvencies. By the end of 1982,
well before the full extent of the losses from this period were
known, the central bank had set aside an amount equal to
US$364 million to cover losses from liquidation of failed banks
alone. However, the reserves understated the true costs, because
the central bank could use non-earmarked reserves to cover the
losses.4 9
In 1985 another crisis occurred when difficulties at the Bank
of Italy precipitated a run on uninsured foreign currency deposits.5" Again, the central bank intervened-this time by backing
foreign currency deposits under certain conditions.5 '
Finally, the banking system imploded once more at the end
of 1989.52 The government's decision to free the foreign exchange market and decontrol prices on December 20, 1989,
sparked sudden price increases." When banks could not meet
withdrawals by fixed term depositors,54 the government declared

Balifio, The Argentine Banking Crisis of 1980 at 92 & 92 n 58 (cited in note 36).
Id; Magliano,'2 La Protectional Depositanteat 156 (cited in note 40).
46 Balifio, The Argentine Banking Crisis of 1980 at 99-100 (cited in note 36);
Magliano, 2 La Proteccional Depositanteat 154 (cited in note 40).
"' Balifio, The Argentine Banking Crisis of 1980 at 102 (cited in note 36).
48 Id at 58.
49 Id at 103-04.
o Magliano, 2 La Proteccional Depositanteat 160 (cited in note 40).
51 Id.
52 See, for example, personal interview with Javier Gonzilez Fraga, Asesor, Mercado

de Valores de Buenos Aires S.L, Dec 15, 1992 ("Fraga Interview"); Magliano Interview
(cited in note 2).
' See Argentina, IBC Intl Rep (Jan 8, 1990), available on LEXIS (WORLD library,
IBCINT file).
" See Latin American Newsletters, Argentina: Cash Squeeze Halts Austral's Plunge,
Latin Am Weekly Rep 9 (Jan 18, 1990).
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a six-day bank holiday55 and converted deposits in excess of one
million australes (about US$800) into dollar-denominated, 10
year, six percent government bonds (Bonex).56 This measure effectively reduced the money supply by eliminating short-term
bank deposit accounts; it also allowed the government to finance
part of its deficit by effectively selling Bonex to private bank
account customers rather than by issuing new currency and consequently inflating the money supply.57 The plan was a rude
shock to depositors: their ostensibly guaranteed deposit accounts
were converted overnight to government bonds which immediately traded at twenty two percent of par" and did not pay interest
for at least four months.59 The measure was understandably
unpopular with depositors, and necessitated the resignation of
the president of the central bank as propitiation." The Bonex
plan did, however, stabilize the situation and allow the government some time to formulate more fundamental reforms.
In March 1991, the central bank drastically limited the scope
of the deposit insurance guarantee.6 Deposits were insured only
up to an amount in australs equal to approximately US$1000,
with no insurance thereafter. Furthermore, the government's
total commitment to the insurance program was limited to a
special fund containing US$50 million in dollar-denominated
Bonex.62
The principal motivation for this action appears to have been
the high costs and inflationary effects of the prior system of implicit and explicit deposit insurance. During the 1980s, 51 banks
and 119 nonbank institutions (savings and loans, credit companies, or financial companies) failed, and others were merged with
government assistance in order to avoid failure." Additional

See Argentina, IBC Intl Rep (cited in note 53).
56 See Latin American Newsletters, IDB Bullish on Argentine Outlook, Latin Am

Regional Rep: Southern Cone 6 (Nov 22, 1990), available on LEXIS (WORLD library, LAN
file); World Bank, Argentina: Public FinanceReview at 180-81 (cited in note 27).
" See Bank of America NT and SA World Information Services, Argentina, Country
Outlooks (Mar 1991), available on LEXIS (WORLD library, WISOUT file).
Fraga Interview (cited in note 52).
See Argentina, IBC Intl Rep (Apr 20, 1990), available on LEXIS (WORLD library,
IBCINT file). Fraga Interview (cited in note 52).
Fraga Interview (cited in note 52).
6, Magliano Interview (cited in note 2).
62 World Bank, Argentina: Public Finance Review at 181 (cited in note 27); Personal
interview with Ricardo Angles, President, and Juan J. Bruchou, Vice President and
Argentina General Counsel, Citibank, N.A., Dec 21, 1992 ("Citibank Interviews").
' Business International, The Monetary System - National Monetary Institutions, Fi-
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bank failures occurred during the crisis of 1989-1991.' 4 The number of financial entities (banks and nonbank institutions) fell
from 721 in 1978 to 236 in 1989.65
These failures, and other interventions such as assisted
mergers and open-bank assistance, were enormously costly.66
During the 1980s, the central bank paid approximately US$15
billion on deposit guarantees.6 7 Costly in their own right, these
expenditures exacerbated inflation by pumping large amounts of
new money into the banking system.
Leading forces behind the government's decision to limit
deposit insurance included Eugenio Pendds, a director of the
central bank, and Roque Ferndndez, the incoming central bank
president. Fern~ndez had written several articles in the 1980s
blaming deposit insurance for some of the problems in the Argentine financial system during 1980-1982."
.
Legislative action on deposit insurance came in 1992. The
new law explicitly guarantees the independence of the central
bank from the political branches of government.69 It prohibits
the central bank from granting loans to the national government,
or to provinces or municipalities, except when secured by government bonds.70 While this provision is principally designed to
prevent the central bank from monetizing fiscal deficits, it has
the effect of limiting the ability of government entities to borrow
from the central bank in order to pay out depositors in the large
state bank sector. Further, the law prohibits the central bank
from granting any special guarantees which "directly or indirect-

nancing Foreign Operations (Aug 1, 1990), available on LEXIS (WORLD library, FINFOR
file); Letter from Augusto C. Magliano to Geoffrey P. Miller (Apr 13, 1993) ("Magliano

Letter").
Magliano Interview (cited in note 2).
Business International, Monetary System, Financing Foreign Operations (cited in
note 63). Eight more financial entities failed in the first six months of 1990. Id.
6
Fraga Interview (cited in note 52) (quoting a 1990 central bank report which concluded that during the 1980s the central bank lost US$67 billion).
67

Id.

See Roque B. Fernandez, La CrisisFinancieraArgentina: 1980-1982, 23 Desarrollo
Econ6mico 79 (Apr-Jun 1983); Ernest V. Feldman, La Crisis FinancieraArgentina: 19801982, Rdplica, 23 Desarrollo Econ6mico 449 (Oct-Dec 1983) (commenting on the article
'

written by Fernandez in the same issue).
' Carta Orgdnica del Banco Central (cited in note 3). The law grants central bank
board members six-year terms, id at Art 7; provides that they cannot be removed except
for poor performance, id at Art 9; and states that "in the creation and execution of monetary and financial policy, the central bank will not be subject to orders or instructions
from the National Executive Power [i.e., the President]." Id at Art 3.
71

Id at Art 19(a).
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ly, implicit or explicitly, cover obligations of financial entities,
including depository institutions.""v This is a direct prohibition
of any form of deposit insurance. Finally, the law prohibits the
central bank from providing temporary liquidity assistance to
financial institutions for periods of more than 30 days or for an
amount greater than the institution's capital; and it requires that
any such temporary liquidity assistance be backed by adequate
security.72 The new law thus unequivocally states that the central bank may not provide any sort of insurance for bank deposits, either implicit (by assisting troubled banks) or explicit (by
paying off depositors after failure).7 3
The repeal of deposit insurance appears to have been principally the idea of persons within the central bank, including
Fernandez and Pendds. They saw deposit insurance as distorting
banking markets and posing a danger of costly and inflationary
government bail-outs. Many other influential groups, on the
other hand, opposed deposit insurance repeal. For example, the
Radical Party supported retention of deposit insurance and argued that the central bank should have greater power to provide
liquidity assistance to troubled banks.74
The leading private bank interest groups also opposed deposit insurance repeal, although all were willing to accept a relatively low ceiling for insurance protection. The foreign banks had no
real interest in the matter since virtually all opted out of the
system in the 1980s.75 The World Bank, which had strongly rec-

71 Id at Art 19(k).
72 Id at Arts 17(b-c), 19(d).
7' The law does provide depositors with a priority in bankruptcy up to the first
$3,000 in peso deposits, however. Id at Art 49; Personal interview with Raul Passano,
Subdirector Ejecutivo, and Ignaco J. Carlos Premoli, Director Ejecutivo, Asociaci6n de
Bancos del Interior de la Repdiblica Argentina (ABIRA), Dec 17, 1992 ("ABIRA Interview").
" Personal interview with Jos6 Maria Ibarbia, Diputado de la Naci6n, Bloque Ucede,
Dec 14, 1992 ("Ibarbia Interview"); Personal interview with Dr. Miguel A. Balestrini,
Diputado de la Naci6n, Dec 17, 1992 ("Balestrini Interview").
" Personal interview with Osvaldo J. Ventura, Subgerente General, Chemice Bank
Argentina, and Cesar A. Deymonnaz, Subgerente General, Banco Holandes Argentina,
Dec 14, 1992 ("ABRA Interviews"); Ibarbia Interview (cited in note 74); Personal interview
with Norberto Carlos Peruzzotti, Director Ejecutivo, Maria Elena Deligiannis, Jefe del Dpt
de Estudios Econ6micos, and Roque Maccarone, Presidente, Asociaci6n de Bancos
Argentinos, Dec 16, 1992 ("ADEBA Interview"); ABIRA Interview (cited in note 73). Public
provincial banks, which enjoy an (ostensible) deposit guarantee from their governmental
owners, favored deposit insurance repeal, which would place them at a competitive
advantage vis-a-vis their private counterparts. Personal interview with Julio Alsogaray,
Director Administrativo, Asociaci6n de Bancos de Provincia de la Repdblica Argentina,
Dec 16, 1992 ("ABAPRA Interview"). Cooperative banks also opposed deposit insurance
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ommended legislation establishing the independence of the central bank,7" did not advocate repeal or even limitation of explicit
deposit insurance. Instead, the World Bank recommended that
deposit insurance and bank regulation be carried out by an authority separate from the central bank.77 In fact, the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund privately opposed
repeal of deposit insurance on the ground that it would threaten
the stability of the Argentine banking system.7"
With the reform measures instituted by the Menem government, especially the convertibility law effective in April 1991,
depositors began to return to the Argentine banking system. As
shown in Table 5, the banking system held only $12.9 billion in
deposits at year-end 1989. As the banking crisis worsened, deposits continued to fall to $9.7 billion by year-end 1990. By March of
1991, deposits reached a nadir of $8.4 billion.79 However, the
convertibility law appears to have reversed this trend: between
March 1991 and August 1992, deposits nearly tripled, rising to
$22.8 billion. 0 These figures are shown in Table 5.
Table 5: TOTAL DEPosrrs IN THE ARGENTnINE BANKING SYSTEM
IN BII.oNs OF U.S. DoLLARS

Domestic
Currency

Date
12/89
12/90
3/91
12/91
8/92

11.8
7.1
6.0
8.7
12.7

Foreign
Currency

Total

1.1
2.7
3.4
6.6
10.1

12.9
9.7
8.4
5.2
22.8

Source: Asociaci6n de Bancos Argentinos ("ADEBA"), Memoria Anual
1992, 54 (ADEBA, 1992).

funded by the government. Personal interview with Omar C. Trillo, Presidente,
Federaci6n Bancos Cooperativos de la Repfiblica Argentina, Dec 16, 1992 ("FEBANCOOP
Interview").
"' One source suggested that an important motivating force behind the government's
decision to push the central bank legislation was pressure from the World Bank.
Machinea Interview (cited in note 43).
World Bank, Argentina:Reforms for Price Stability and Growth 62 (1990).
78 Personal interview with Roque B. Fernandez, Presidente, Banco Central de la
Repdblica Argentina, Dec 17, 1992 ("FernAndez Interview").
28 Asociaci6n de Bancos Argentinos, Memoria Anual 54 (1992).
"

Id.
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The increase in bank deposits is a sign of enhanced stability
in the banking system. However, the system is not yet fully stabilized. Most importantly, the improvements have largely occurred in Argentina's private banking sector. The public
banks-owned by the national government, the provinces, or the
municipalities-are a disaster by anyone's measure.8 ' For many
years these banks-often staffed by unqualified political appointees-made loans principally to the governments that own them,
or to politicians or friends of persons in the government. 2 Not
surprisingly, the performance of loans at public banks has not
been favorable. As indicated in Table 6, more than 62 percent of
the loans of national public banks and more than 52 percent of
the loans of provincial and municipal banks were of doubtful
status. In comparison, less than 15 percent of the loans of all
categories of private banks, and a mere 5 percent of the loans of
private banks in Buenos Aires, were of doubtful status.
Table 6:

DOUBTFUL LoANs AS A PERCENTAGE OF ASSETS,

By TYPE OF INSTITUTION,

Type of Institution

APRIL

1982

Percent Doubtful Loans

National Public Banks
Prov. &Mun. Public Banks
Private Buenos Aires Banks
Private Interior Banks
Foreign Banks
Cooperative Banks
Total for All Banks

62.83%
52.32%
4.99%
13.07%
4.83%
17.84%
42.72%

Source: ADEBA, Memoria Anual 1992 at 64.

The national government has yet to take action on the public
sector banks, which are nearly all insolvent by standard accounting measures. Immediate deregulation of the state-owned banks
might provoke catastrophic runs.83 The central bank, quite reasonably, takes the position that the provincial and municipal
banks are the problems of the provinces and municipalities, and
81 Ibarbia Interview (cited in note 74).
82 ABAPRA Interview (cited in note 75).

Ibarbia Interview (cited in note 74).
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not the national government's responsibility.' At some point,
however, the mess will have to be cleared up by the government,
since most of the provinces and municipalities that own banks do
not have the resources to resolve their difficulties. How the resolution will occur is yet to be seen.
IV. ANALYSIS
I now turn to an analysis of deposit insurance reform in
Argentina, addressing three questions: (1) how is it that repeal of
deposit insurance was possible in Argentina, when similar reform
would appear to be out of the question in the United States; (2)
has Argentina reliably committed itself not to rescue a failing
bank and not to intervene in the event of a single bank failure
that generalizes into systemic panic; and (3) how has the private
market adjusted to the apparent repeal of all forms of deposit
insurance in Argentina, implicit as well as explicit?
A. The Politics of Fundamental Reform in Argentina
From the standpoint of United States banking regulation,
the decision by the Argentine government to relinquish any role
in bank deposit insurance is a matter of considerable interest.
The United States banking industry has itself recently passed
through a crisis of staggering dimensions, one which dwarfs, in
absolute terms, the comparable problems in Argentina.8 5 The
deposit insurance funds for both the savings and loan industry
and the commercial banking industry became insolvent, requiring
a taxpayer bailout that may end up costing $200 billion in present value terms. 6
But when the U.S. Congress turned to consider deposit insurance reform, in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA),"7 it failed to reduce the deposit insurance ceiling of $100,000 per depositor per institution'-a ceiling so generous that any depositor in his or her

Fernandez Interview (cited in note 78).
' For discussion, see James R. Barth, R. Dan Brumbaugh, Jr. and Robert Litan, The
Futureof American Banking (M.E. Sharpe, Inc, 1992); Lowell L. Bryan, Bankrupt: Restoring the Health and Profitabilityof Our Banking System (Harper, 1992).
' See Barth, Brumbaugh & Litan, The Future of American Banking at 1 (cited in
note 85).
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, 12 USC §§ 18111833 (1991).
' See 12 USC § 1823(a)(1)(B).
84
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right mind can obtain effectively infinite protection by splitting
money among accounts in different institutions. The FDICIA did
nothing to alter the essential nature of the U.S. system. Deposit
insurance in the United States appears impervious to truly
meaningful reform. 9 What explains the dramatic differences
between the treatment of deposit insurance by the two countries?
In large measure, the reforms in the Argentine deposit insurance system can be explained by the broad political and economic
circumstances of 1989-1991-circumstances which, elsewhere, I
have described as a "constitutional moment" in modern Argentine
history. Plagued by the disaster of hyperinflation and exhausted by years of political instability, the Argentine public reached a
remarkable consensus that fundamental reform was necessary to
rectify the deteriorating situation. Above all, the important political actors recognized that in order to stanch hyperinflation it was
essential to close the taps of government spending and subsidies.91
In addition to these general conditions, which facilitated
fundamental reforms in a number of areas, several unique factors
in the banking industry made repeal of deposit insurance politically feasible. First, from the standpoint of the Argentine experience, the decision to abolish deposit insurance did not appear to
impose the sorts of extreme risks that might be perceived if a
similar reform were adopted in the United States. Compared to
the dangers and costs of rampant hyperinflation-or even to the
losses associated with the 1989 Bonex plan-the risk posed by
the removal of deposit insurance did not seem particularly significant.92 Besides, deposit insurance was of limited value to Argentine depositors. Even when depositors were paid during the
hyperinflation period, they often had to wait months for their
money, during which time the value of their funds in real terms rapidly dissipated.9 3
Moreover, Argentines tend to have a well-warranted suspicion concerning the evenhandedness of government programs,
having observed over many years that government subsidies tend
to go to persons with influence. The discretionary liquidity assis-

"' Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller, Banking Law and Regulation 264 (Little
Brown, 1992).
o See Geoffrey P. Miller, ConstitutionalMoments, Precommitment, and Fundamental
Reform: The Case of Argentina, 71 Wash U L Q 1201, 1203 (1993).
9, See, for example, ADEBA Interview (cited in note 75).
Magliano Interview (cited in note 2).
9 ABIRA Interview (cited in note 73).
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tance loans that the central bank made repeatedly during the
1980s smacked of this kind of political favoritism. Banks that
extended loans to friends of the incumbent politicians might well
be in a better position to seek central bank assistance than banks
that did not do so; and banks whose owners or managers were
well-connected in government circles might be more likely to
obtain assistance than banks whose owners or managers were
out of favor." As a result, the repeal of deposit insurance probably appealed to many Argentines as a means for reducing political favoritism in the dispensation of government benefits.
Another significant factor was the impact of hyperinflation.
As we have seen, the government's implicit and explicit deposit
insurance guarantees were extremely costly to the central
bank.95 When the central bank advanced these funds, the effect
was to pump new money into an already inflationary economy,
thus exacerbating the price increases. In a country such as Argentina, which through harsh experience is sensitized to the
dangers of hyperinflation, deposit insurance is seen by many as
much more dangerous than in the United States because of its
procyclical effect on the inflationary spiral. By the same token,
repeal of deposit insurance promised to reduce the threat of further rounds of hyperinflation in the future.
B. Does Implicit Deposit Insurance Exist in Argentina Today?
Argentina has attempted to repeal all forms of deposit insurance, implicit as well as explicit. However, the question remains
whether the government will keep its promise not to bail out
depositors if a significant bank fails or if the banking system as a
whole falls into a panic such as those that occurred in 1980-1981
and 1989-1991. As yet, there have been no major bank failures
under the new regime, so the government's commitment to the
announced policy of not providing any deposit insurance has yet
to be tested."
However, the Argentine government has utilized a variety of

The central bank's statistics on the astonishing costs to the government of assisting failing banks during the 1980s, released in April, 1992, gave added impetus to passage of the legislation that established the independence of the central bank and prohibited it from protecting depositors. barbia Interview (cited in note 74). The central bank law
is discussed at text accompanying notes 69-74.
'5 See notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
There have, however, been a few small bank failures. Fraga Interview (cited in
note 52).
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pre-commitment devices to assure world financial markets that it
will not, in fact, bail out depositors. For example, the central
bank's newly independent status gives it a more reliable ability
to resist the political pressures that will inevitably arise if a
major bank or series of banks fails. 7 Equally important, the
central bank is now prohibited by law from providing deposit
insurance, and has only limited powers to provide liquidity assistance to struggling banks. 8 For the central bank to act contrary
to these legal prohibitions, new legislation would be required
(unless the government elected to act illegally).
Moreover, leading government officials have been willing to
state for the record, unconditionally, that they will not rescue
banks or bail out depositors. The current central bank president,
Roque Fernandez, so stated in an interview granted for the preparation of this paper.9 The message which the government has
given to the financial sector and, indirectly, to the public, is
straightforward and unequivocal: no form of deposit insurance,
explicit or implicit, exists in Argentina today.'
A further pre-commitment device is the convertibility law,
which is widely viewed as the fulcrum of Argentina's recent economic recovery.' If the central bank were to cover depositors
in a failed bank and the bank were big enough, the consequences
would be to create a new deficit in the central bank's accounts.
Such a deficit would threaten to violate the convertibility law by
potentially expanding the domestic monetary base beyond the
central bank's stock of gold and foreign reserves. If that were to
happen, the financial sector might lose confidence in the
convertibility program as a whole and run the peso, leaving the
government with the uncomfortable choice between accepting
renewed hyperinfiation or explicitly dollarizing the economy. 1'
Because these choices are both unpalatable, the government is
unlikely to abandon the convertibility law in the interest of rescuing a bank unless the banking sector is truly in crisis.
Thus, despite the political pressures to provide ex post implicit deposit insurance which the central bank will inevitably

See text accompanying notes 70-71.
9 See text accompanying notes 72-74.
"
Fernandez Interview (cited in note 78).
Leading figures outside the government tend to agree that the government would
not bail out failing banks. See, for example, Machinea Interview (cited in note 43).
'o' See text accompanying note 80.
'o
See Fraga Interview (cited in note 52) (if government were to break its commitment not to bail out banks, the convertibility law would be violated as well).
'7
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face in the event of a major bank failure, fairly good mechanisms
are in place to prevent this from happening.
This is not to say that the central bank would adhere to its
commitment not to rescue banks or depositors in all circumstances; if conditions become unstable enough, the government might
find that it has little to lose from reneging on its promise. Several interviewees doubted whether the government would adhere to
its promise if a major bank failed.' Further, there is no assurance that a new government (presidential elections are scheduled
for 1995) would adhere to the no-bailout policy as stringently as
the current administration. Nevertheless, the mechanisms adopted to date provide a fairly high level of assurance that banks and
depositors in Argentina will not be able to look to the government for succor when financial institutions fail.
C. Market Responses to Deposit Insurance Reform
Finally, although the total repeal of deposit insurance is still
a recent event, it is not too early to examine some of the early
market responses to this action. Are institutions evolving to mitigate the risks that an uninsured banking sector poses for depositors and others who utilize banking services?
One important force for ensuring that banks in Argentina,
are well-managed and do not take improper risks with depositors
funds is the interbank call market-the market for short-term
lending and borrowing between banks. The call market is an
active and important part of the financial sector, largely because
the central bank has placed a high reserve requirement on current account and sight balances in order to stem inflationary
forces-75 percent in 1992.1" Banks buy and sell funds on the
call market in order to stay just within their required reserve
ratios. Banks active in this market provide one another with
their financial statements as filed with the central bank. 10 5 A
bank that runs into financial difficulties will quickly find itself
unable to borrow funds in the call market unless it can convince
a lending bank that it is in fact a good credit risk. In addition,
banks in the call market routinely provide one another with
updated financial statements filed with the central bank in order

10

See, for example, ABIRA Interview (cited in note 73).

'
Business International, 4.2 Monetary Policy, Financing Foreign Operations (Jun 1,
1992), available on LEXIS (WORLD library, FINFOR file).
"o'ABRA Interview (cited in note 75).
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to demonstrate their solvency.' ° In the case of Argentina,
Citibank has taken on the de facto role of principal supervisor of
other private banks. During the crisis of 1989-1991, Citibank advanced substantial call loans to banks in financial trouble when
other call money dried up, on the strength of Citibank's belief
that the banks were in fact good credit risks." 7
One might suppose that the repeal of deposit insurance
would provide an ideal opportunity for insurance firms to step
into the gap left by the government and offer forms of private
deposit insurance. Sources interviewed were unanimous, however, that this has not happened and is not likely to happen any
time soon because the Argentine insurance industry is financially
incapable of offering reliable guarantees.'
A number of other private arrangements, however, have
begun to develop to replace the now-defunct government safety
net. Argentine banks have attempted to negotiate lines of credit
from U.S. banks to assist them in the event of financial difficulties. 0 9 Several interviewees said that private Argentine banks
are also attempting to work out agreements to help one another
in the event of a financial crisis."0 Other interviewees, however, denied that formal understandings for mutual support are
being negotiated."'
Rating agencies began operating in November 1992, and are
expected to provide information to the market about the solvency
of banks as well as industrial firms."' It is anticipated that all
private Argentine banks will eventually have published credit
ratings."'
Also in 1993, the central bank announced the creation of a
risk appraisal office, which will offer a data bank containing
information on bank credits and a listing of debtors to financial
entities."' The purpose of this service is to allow lenders to evalu10 Citibank interviews (cited in note 62).
107 Id.
108

See, for example, ADEBA Interview (cited in note 75).

10 Magliano Interview (cited in note 2).
11

Id; Fernandez Interview (cited in note 78). These agreements, however, are difficult

to negotiate because banks lack fully effective means to control one another's behavior.
Magliano Interview (cited in note 2). President Ferndndez indicated, however, that the
central bank stood ready to coordinate private rescue efforts in the event of the failure of
a significant Argentine bank. Fernandez Interview (cited in note 78).
...ADEBA Interview (cited in note 75).
.1.ABRA Interview (cited in note 75). Opinions of rating agencies are required for the
issuance of bonds. Id.
113

Id.

.14 Banco de la Nacion Argentina, Outlook, 8 Fundaci6n Mediterrdnea Newsletter 2-3
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ate the creditworthiness of major borrowers by finding out what
loans they have outstanding at other institutions.
In addition to the reforms intended to ensure market discipline, the central bank now requires banks doing business in
Argentina to maintain capital (i.e., net worth) equal to at least
eight percent of risk-adjusted assets, in general accord with the
risk-adjusted capital guidelines adopted by the Bank for International Settlements in Basle." 5
In short, it appears that the Argentine banking system is
indeed adjusting to the repeal of deposit insurance and private
market mechanisms are springing up to replace the loss of the
government safety net. It is too early to assess whether these
private market adjustments are adequate replacements for the
government's deposit insurance guarantee, but the initial appraisal by knowledgeable people interviewed for this article was
hopeful. Time will tell how effectively private mechanisms can
substitute for government insurance in the depository institution
industry. For that reason, among others, the Argentine experiment is well worth careful scrutiny by all those interested in the
fundamental problems of banking law and regulation.
CONCLUSION

In this article, I have examined the decision of Argentina's
government to repeal its programs of implicit and explicit deposit
insurance. After discussing the political and economic background of the repeal, I addressed three important questions: (1)
how could fundamental reform such as this have occurred in a
society which has for so many years been dominated by powerful
vested interests; (2) has Argentina indeed repealed all forms of
deposit insurance, implicit as well as explicit; and (3) how has
the private market responded to the deposit insurance reforms.
Three general conclusions follow. First, fundamental reform
could occur because Argentina was in the midst of a political and
economic crisis in which the public had reached a consensus that
profound changes were necessary for Argentina to achieve stability and regain some of its lost prosperity. More particularly, deposit insurance repeal was facilitated by the fact that most bank
deposits had fled the system at the time the reform occurred, by
(Apr 1993).

...
ABRA Interview (cited in note 75). See, for general discussion of the BIS-Basle
guidelines, Comment, Capital-BasedRegulation and U.S. Banking Reform, 101 Yale L J
1525, 1526 (1992).

152

The University of Chicago Law School Roundtable

[1993:

the uncertainty and losses that bank depositors had experienced
even with deposit insurance in place, and by the connection
which important policy makers drew between the costs of deposit
insurance and the problems of inflation and hyperinflation, which
corroded the very fabric of Argentine society.
Second, Argentina has provided a surprising degree of assurance to markets that deposit insurance has indeed been repealed.
This assurance takes the form of three mechanisms: (1) the independence of the central bank, which insulates that institution to
a degree from political pressures to bail out particular institutions or depositors; (2) statutory prohibitions on deposit insurance and stringent limitations on the central bank's ability to
loan money to governments or to shaky banks; and (3) the
convertibility law, the centerpiece of recent successful reforms,
which would be threatened if the central bank were to expend
large amounts of funds rescuing failed or failing banks or their
depositors.
Third, some private market mechanisms are developing to
respond to the withdrawal of the government safety net. It is too
early to assess whether the private market response will be adequate in light of the risks, but the initial indications appear favorable.
Argentina's experience with deposit insurance repeal should
be of considerable interest to policymakers in the United States
because it offers a test case in which a major economy engaged in
radical reforms to its system of banking regulation. It will be
useful to examine how those reforms play out over time in order
to evaluate whether the United States should consider experimenting with more stringent limitations on deposit insurance
than have been feasible until now, despite the catastrophic failures of both the savings and loan and bank insurance funds over
the past decade.

